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THE AFTERMATH OF MCC-MARBLE:
IS THIS THE DEATH KNELL FOR THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE?
PAOLO TORZILLI*
Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex-where the reason for the
rule ceases, the rule also ceases.1 Twentieth century American
case law contains numerous court holdings that recognize the
maxim that once society no longer embraces a particular public
policy objective, the associated rule must be reworked or
eliminated.2 To sustain the vitality of our legal system, scholars
J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.B.A.,
George Washington School of Business & Public Management.
1 See Dubois v. Hepburn, 35 U.S. 1, 7 (1836); Green v. Liter, 12 U.S. 229, 249
(1814); In re Trust Estate of Farrington, 42 Haw. 640, 649 (1958). This "old maxim"
has been attributed to Chief Justice Coke. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 986 (1995); P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM
AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 89 (1987).
It is a well-settled rule that the law varies with the varying reasons on which it
is founded. This is expressed by the maxim: "Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex." This
means that no law can survive the reasons on which it is founded. It needs no
statute to change it; it abrogates itself If the reasons on which a law rests are
overborne by opposing reasons, which, in the progress of society, gain a controlling
force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle and good in its
application to some circumstances, must cease to apply as a controlling principle to
the new circumstances. See Beardsley v. City of Hartford, 50 Conn. 529, 541-42
(1883); see also Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 385 (1933) (Sutherland, J.)
(quoting with approval the Connecticut Supreme Court's interpretation of the
maxim); Marshall v. Moseley, 21 N.Y. 280, 292 (1860) ("[W]hen the reason for the
rule ceases, [judges] have the right to renounce it."). More recently, this precept was
fortified by Justice Carro. See Thomas Crimmins Contracting Co. v. City of New
York, 530 N.Y.S. 2d 779, 782 (1st Dep't. 1988) ("It should go without saying that
when the reason for the rule ceases, the rule also ceases .... ").
Similarly, another rule of law states that a law " 'should not be applied when
there is no reason for it.' " United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 723, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (quoting In re Troy's Estate, 37 P.2d 471, 472
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934)).
2 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In rejecting the
"separate but equal" doctrine, the Court referred to the existing doctrine as
reflecting the "status of public education at that time." Id. at 489. The Court's
rationale was based on the fact that "these days, it is doubtful that any child may
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and judges must continually scrutinize legal doctrine and
propose changes when public policy warrants it. 3 One prominent
subject of such scrutiny has been the parol evidence rule.4
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education." Id. at 493 (emphasis added); see also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Javins court overruled certain aspects of
landlord-tenant law that had their source in feudal times. See id. at 1074. In so
doing, Circuit Judge Skelly Wright wrote "[clourts have a duty to reappraise old
doctrines in the light of the facts and values of contemporary life-particularly old
common law doctrines which the courts themselves created and developed." Id.
Judge Cardozo clearly recognized the need to reconcile the law with societal
needs. For example, in the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), he limited the caveat emptor doctrine in products
liability law. In so doing he wrote:
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the
conditions of travel to-day. The principle that the danger must be
imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do
change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization
require them to be.
Id. at 1053.
3 See Lief H. Carter, When Courts Should Make Policy: An Institutional
Approach, in PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 141, 141-55 (John A. Gardiner ed.,
1977) (highlighting the public policy objectives underlying various landmark
Supreme Court rulings of the early 1970s); William T. Gossett, Balances and
Controls in Private Policy and Decision-Making, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA
26, 26-27 (1968). Gossett states:
One's "vision of the law changes with the changing facts of life - the
perceptions, fears and aspirations by which the consensus of the nation
assigns priorities to the basic purposes of the law.... There is a silent
consent.., as to the direction in which they are moving, the uneasiness
that they experience and the restraints that they feel; and these things are
spelled out in law-making, decision-making, and rule-making...."
Id.
Similarly, judges understand that the law must evolve. Numerous opinions
reflect this understanding. Justice Jacobs wrote one of the most eloquent opinions in
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965):
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and
the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping its
common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions which
make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit the law should be
readily rejected....
Id. at 325; see also Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) ("[Ihe continued vitality of the common law,.., depends upon its ability
to reflect contemporary community values and ethics."); Yeo v. Tweedy, 286 P. 970,
972 (N.M. 1929) ("[Ilt is often said that our common law is adaptable; that, while its
principles operate continuously, changed conditions modify its rules.... ").
4 See Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.S. 709 (1944) (indicating that the parol evidece rule is "no rule at all"); Sherwood
Concrete, Inc. v. Wick Building Systems, Inc., 1992 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1393, at *8
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he parol evidence rule... is an exclusionary rule not
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Generally, the parol evidence rule seeks to exclude
testimony of negotiations occurring prior to, or contemporaneous
with, the execution of a written instrument.5 Numerous reasons
for the parol evidence rule have been set forth.6 Two of these
policy reasons are universally accepted. First, jurors are
generally considered to be extremely impressionable. 7 Second,
there is a need for the integrity of a writing to be preserved.8
Although courts have embraced the reasons behind the parol
evidence rule, the uniformity ends there. This lack of uniformity
creates confusion for students, scholars, judges, and
practitioners. The confusion regarding this rule is enhanced by
favored by the law.") (quoting Cobb State Bank v. Nelson, 413 N.W. 2d 644, 646
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987)); see also David R. Dow, The Confused State of the Parol
Evidence Rule in Texas, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 457, 458 (1994) ("The weight of modem
authority, it is fair to say, urges a narrow construction, if not outright
abandonment, of the Rule."); Id. at 458 n.8 (chronicling the scholarly and judicial
castigation of the parol evidence rule); Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol
Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1060-
68 (1968) (proposing improvements to the parol evidence rule).
5 See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Oince a
contract is found to be unambiguous the parol evidence rule excludes statements
offered to contradict a clear contract term in a final expression of agreement.");
Radiation Sys. Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (D.D.C. 1995)
("Generally, when parties have reduced their entire agreement to writing, the parol
evidence rule excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements
inconsistent with the express terms of the writing."); Cusimano v. First Maryland
Sav. and Loan, Inc., 639 A.2d 553, 560 (D.C. 1994) (holding that the parol evidence
rule prohibits the introduction of evidence to "add to, contradict, or explain" the
terms of an unambiguous contract provision); see also CLAYTON P. GILLETTE &
STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL 139 (1999) ("The parol
evidence rule asks [the] question: Assuming that a party can enforce a contract,
what evidence is admissible to prove its terms?").
6 See Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) ("In formulating the rule
governing parol evidence, several policies must be accommodated."). For a good
discussion of the policy reasons behind the parol evidence rule, see Judge Posner's
decision in Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 745-46 (7th Cir.
1988).
7 See American Underwriting Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 303 A.2d
121, 126 n.2 (1973) (concluding "that the parol evidence rule arose out of a fear of
invention by witnesses and also to allow courts to prevent juries from making
findings of fact based on their sympathies").
8 See George I. Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts - Impact
of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 MO. L. REV. 651,
653 (1979) ("The parol evidence rule... sanctifies the writing at the expense of the
parties by excluding other forms of evidence from the jury's consideration when they
determine the agreement of the parties.").
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the inconsistent application of the rule9 and the limited
precedential value provided by appellate decisions. 0 In addition,
the semantics of the rule itself are paradoxical."1 Finally, the
rule is virtually engulfed by a plethora of exceptions. 2
Nevertheless, the parol evidence rule survives. 13
9 See Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There is a Parol Evidence
Rule in California - The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 71 (1995)
(stating that "[a] rule which produces such mind-numbing manipulations cannot be
justified as law or good policy").
10 See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 (1952) (indicating that
appellate decisions often create the appearance that the court is making an
assumption that a contract represents an accurate integration, but this appearance
is often erroneous).
11 The rule's application does not apply exclusively to parol (oral) terms. See
Hawley v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 243, 248 (S.D. Ohio 1990) ("[Ihe 'parol
evidence rule' is not limited to oral evidence."). It is a substantive rule, not a rule of
evidence. See Electric Distrib., Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166 F.3d 1074, 1082 n.3 (10th Cir.
1999); see also In re Continental Resources Corp., 799 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1986)
("We begin by observing that the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law.");
Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 1983) ("The parol
evidence rule is, of course, fundamentally a rule of substantive law, not the law of
evidence .... Thus, any evidence offered to prove earlier conduct is irrelevant if
offered to contradict unambiguous writing.") (emphasis added); Investors Royalty
Co. v. Lewis, 91 P.2d 764, 766 (Okla. 1939) ("The parol evidence rule is a rule of
substantive law.").
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214. The Restatement provides
that:
Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the
adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish
(a) that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement;
(b) that the integrated agreement, if any, is completely or partially
integrated;
(c) the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated;
(d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, or other
invalidating cause;
(e) ground for granting or denying rescission, reformation, specific
performance, or other remedy.
Id.
13 Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to expand its exclusionary force.
Alaska is one example. Compare Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 455 P.2d 218 (Alaska
1969) (adopting generous policy towards extrinsic evidence), with Alaska N. Dev.,
Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1983) (limiting admissibility
of extrinsic evidence). There has been abundant study of the rule in Alaska. See
Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV.
1131, 1148-50 (1995); Leonard Marinaccio III, Note, Out on Parol? A Critical
Examination of the Alaska Supreme Court's Application of the Parol Evidence Rule,
11 ALASKA L. REV. 405, 405 (1994) (chronicling "the imprecision and confusion that
has plagued the application of the parol evidence rule in Alaska"); see also Robert C.
Erwin, Parol Evidence or Not Parol Evidence, 8 ALASKA L.J. 20 (1970).
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The difficulties surrounding the rule have prompted some to
call for its curtailment, or even its demise.14 This position has
gained new support in recent years. The judicial trend limiting
the exclusionary force of the rule was advanced with the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's holding in MCC-Marble
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, SpA. 15 The
court held that cases governed by the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) may not apply the parol evidence rule to preclude parties
from proffering extrinsic evidence. 16 The MCC-Marble decision
leaves observers to question whether such a ruling will permeate
contract cases governed by other law.17
This Note posits that the parol evidence rule, as a device to
exclude extrinsic evidence of prior agreements, should be
abandoned. Part I defines the parameters of the rule, its
intended function, and judicial trends in this area of the law.
Parts II and III review the CISG and its treatment of extrinsic
evidence. Part IV analyzes relevant American case law. Part V
of this Note discusses the public policy reasons for the rule and
examines the extent to which those policy objectives are no
longer embraced. Part VI identifies ramifications of the rule's
abandonment. This Note ultimately concludes that the rule is
an evolutionary relic. Contract law must adapt to modern
business practices. The holding in MCC-Marble confirms that
the interests of commerce and trade are best served without the
parol evidence rule.
I. THE RULE'S FUNCTION AND CASE LAW TREND
The intention of this Note is to go beyond a discussion of
doctrinal framework.' 8 In order to conceptualize the elimination
14 See supra note 4.
15 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1087 (1999).
16 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, reprinted in 15 U.S.CA. app. 52, at 332 (West 1997) [hereinafter
CISGI.
17 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (explaining the effect of the
parol evidence rule); U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) (explaining the effect of the parol
evidence rule).
18 Several comprehensive works have been published on the subject of the parol
evidence rule. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.2-7.6 (2d ed. 1990)
(explaining the rationale and the application of the parol evidence rule); CoRBIN,
supra note 10, §§ 573-96 (criticizing the rule); 9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
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of the rule, however, several important cases must be reviewed.
This review is necessary because it is easier to accept
abandonment of the rule when viewed in light of the trend
supporting its abandonment.
A. Case Law Trend: Narrow Interpretation of the Parol
Evidence Rule
Cases from the nineteenth century strictly applied the parol
evidence rule.'9 In Thompson v. Libbey,20 the parties agreed to a
sale of logs.21  The seller, Thompson, brought suit for the
purchase price of the logs. 22 Libbey argued that the contract
included a warranty that was breached, thereby discharging his
duty to tender the purchase price of the goods. 23 Libbey claimed
that, though such a term did not appear in the writing, the
parties had orally agreed to it.24 The court held that the trial
court erred in failing to conclude that the parol evidence rule
barred such extrinsic evidence from consideration by the jury.25
Noting that the writing contained the entire agreement of the
parties, the court declared that "[t]he only criterion of the
completeness of the written contract as a full expression of the
agreement of the parties is the writing itself. 26  Such an
EVIDENCE § 2426 (3d ed. 1940) (chronicling the historical development of the rule);
Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of
Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 39-64 (1985) (reviewing the development and
history of the rule).
19 See, e.g., Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517-18
(1891) (holding extrinsic evidence offered to prove an alleged independent contract
inadmissible).
20 26 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1885).
21 See id. at 2; see also CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS
IN CONTRACT LAW 454-61 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the Thompson case and the
parol evidence rule). The parties memorialized the agreement in a simple writing.
See Thompson, 26 N.W. at 2.
22 See Thompson, 26 N.W. at 2.
23 See id.
2A See id.
25 See id. at 2-4.
26 Id. at 2. One observer has noted that the Thompson ruling "is highly
artificial." See Wallach, supra note 8, at 657.
Naturally, this case was decided before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Suppose Thompson had been decided under the Uniform Commercial Code? It
seems likely that the extrinsic evidence would undoubtedly have been permitted.
This is a very persuasive indicator of the liberalizing trend regarding the parol
evidence rule. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) (stating that certain types of evidence may
[Vol.74:843
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approach led one scholar to conclude that "the reins" were "still
tightly held by the judges."27
B. Case Law Trend: Liberalization
Recent cases have applied the rule more broadly. The
leading case of Masterson v. Sine28  highlights this
liberalization. 29 In Masterson, the defendants appealed the trial
court's determination precluding the admission of extrinsic
evidence that an option to purchase land included an oral term
prohibiting assignment of the option.30 The court held, in a 5-2
decision, that the extrinsic evidence should have been admitted
even though it would have directly contradicted an implied-at-
law term.31 Chief Justice Traynor reasoned that excluding such
evidence was proper only "when the fact finder was likely to be
misled. The rule must therefore be based on the credibility of
the evidence."32 A comparison of the Thompson case with the
more recent Masterson case illustrates the trend of courts
be offered to explain or supplement an otherwise final written agreement between
parties).
27 Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for
Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 370 (1932). McCormick criticized the principle
that "[t]he writing is the 'sole criterion' of its own completeness... [as] too narrow
to meet the actual need for recognition of reasonable and genuine oral agreements
dealing with matters related to those covered by the written document, but not
intended by the parties to be superceded by the writing .... Id. at 369-70.
28 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
29 The Masterson decision still garners significant attention in the world of
legal scholarship. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
533, 562 n.47 (1998) (citing Masterson for its "liberal interpretation of the parol
evidence rule"); Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain
Meaning, Parol Evidence and Use of the "Just Result" Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 557, 598-604 (1998) (discussing the Masterson opinion thirty years after the
case was decided); Madeleine Plasencia, Who's Afraid of Humpty Dumpty:
Deconstructionist References in Judicial Opinions, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 241-
42 (1997) (lauding the legacy of the Masterson line of cases).
30 See Masterson, 436 P.2d at 562. This was vital to the outcome of the case
because if the option was indeed not assignable, the trustee in Masterson's
bankruptcy could not exercise it. See id. Under California law, such an option is
impliedly assignable unless specified to the contrary in writing. See id. at 567
(Burke, J., dissenting).
31 See id. at 565 ("The fact that there is a written memorandum, however, does
not necessarily preclude parol evidence rebutting a term that the law would
otherwise presume.").
32 Id. at 564.
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applying the parol evidence rule less rigorously.33  The
liberalization trend is a signal that courts recognize that the
rule's exclusionary effect is often unworkable. This makes it
easier to advocate the rule's demise.
II. THE CISG AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
After World War II, the United States was experiencing an
economic boom and sought to build a national commercial
network.34 Toward that end, forty-nine states adopted Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).35 The obvious goal of
such adoption was to provide uniformity of law throughout the
country for contracts involving the sale of goods.36 Article 2 of
the UCC has been an unquestioned success.3 7
33 See Posner, supra note 29, at 562 n.50 (1998) (observing California as a
jurisdiction with a liberal approach to parol evidence).
34 See James A. Rahl, 1983 Survey of Books Relating to the Law, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1130 (1983) (reviewing JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981)). Professor Rami acknowledged "the
great growth of the... post-World War II years." Id.
35 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161-62 n.11 (indicating that the
UCC is "the law in 49 States and the District of Columbia"); see also Glenn L.
Norris, et. al., Hedge to Arrive Contracts and the Commodity Exchange Act: A
Textual Alternative, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 319, 337 n.73 (1999); Boyd Allan Byers, Note,
Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise Terminations-A Return-of-
Equity Approach, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 607, 641 (1994) (lauding the authors of
Article 2 of the UCC). This commitment arguably took a great leap forward when
United States Supreme Court decisions of the New Deal era greatly expanded
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Much of the New Deal legislation
had as its goal the creation of national economic systems. See, e.g., Ann Althouse,
Theoretical and Constitutional Issues: Enforcing Federalism after United States v.
Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 812 (1996) ("[TIhe work of [the] New Deal Congress
[was to] struggl[e] with the nation's economic problems."); Suzanna Sherry, The
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 919 (1992) ("The New Deal...
repudiat[ed] the notion that the national government had limited powers over
economic... development.") (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991))
(internal quotation omitted).
36 See John Anecki, Note, Selling in Cyberspace: Electronic Commerce and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 33 GONZAGA L. REV. 395, 396 (1997-98) ("The purpose
of the UCC Article 2, when it was written in 1944, was to foster uniformity between
states in resolving contractual disputes which concern the sale of goods. By 1972,
every state had adopted the UCC except Louisiana.") (footnotes omitted).
37 See Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform Sales Legislation in the Private
Law Area, 79 MINN. L. REV. 861, 869 n.30 (1995) (discussing the general
accomplishments of the UCC within the field of commercial law); Elizabeth Hayes
Patterson, UCC Section 2-612(3): Breach of an Installment Contract and a Hobson's
Choice for the Aggrieved Party, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 177 (1987) (refraining from "a
discourse on the success of Article 2").
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More recently, the United States has attempted to facilitate
international trade.38 One obstacle to international trade has
been the different legal rules used by America's major trading
partners.39 The United Nations responded by creating the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods ("CISG"). 40 The CISG is described as "constantly
38 See 136 CONG. REC. H4140, H4145 (daily ed. June 26, 1990) (remarks of Rep.
Rogers) (discussing the need to promote American enterprise abroad in the face of a
trade war). Private organizations have been established to promote international
trade. See Tom Hamburger & Greg Gordon, Tobacco's Ally Groups Help Get the
Word Out, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 21, 1998, at 1A (discussing the
creation of the New York Society for International Affairs and America-European
Community Association). Some states have made attempts to increase trade within
their borders by creating international trade organization. For example, "Enterprise
Florida, the state's economic development agency" teamed with the Central
America-United States Chamber of Commerce to help promote trade with Latin
American nations and the state of Florida. See The Miami Herald Latin American
Briefs Column, MIAMI HERALD, June 17, 1998; The Miami Herald Latin American
Briefs Column, MIAMI HERALD, June 1, 1998. The need for substantial international
trade is not a goal exclusive to the United States. Professor Robert Hillman of
Cornell Law School recognized an "increasingly global commercial community."
Robert A. Hillman, Applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity, in REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 21 (Cornell
International Law Journal ed., 1995).
39 See FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS, CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 1 (1992) ("[The existence of different national legal systems impedes the
development of international economic relations with complicated problems arising
from the conflict of laws."); Willibald Posch, On the Law of International Sale of
Goods: An Introduction, in SURVEY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 3 (Louis
Lafili et al. eds., 1986) ("Many difficulties in the context of an international sale of
goods occur as a consequence of the considerable differences in the national rules
governing the law of sales."); Michael J. Kolosky, Note, Beyond Partisan Policy: The
Eleventh Circuit Lays Aside the Parol Evidence Rule in Pursuit of International
Uniformity in Commercial Regulation, 24 N.C. J. INTL. L & COM. REG. 199, 199
(1998) (spotting the "conflict of laws" problem inherent in virtually all international
commercial transactions).
40 See CISG, supra note 16; see also Hillman, supra note 38, at 21 ("[The need
to achieve predictability... precipitated the creation of the Convention.") (footnote
omitted); Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 266-67 (1984).
Some have recognized the creation of the CISG as a reflection of a worldwide
objective to create a uniform international sales law. See, e.g., Paul Volken, The
Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-Filling, in INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 19, 46 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986)
[hereinafter DUBROVNIK LECTURES].
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gaining more success as more countries choose to ratify it."41
The CISG is currently in force in fifty two countries, and the
trade activity of these countries accounts for over two-thirds of
all world trade.42
41 Camilla Baasch Andersen, Furthering the Uniform Application of the CISG:
Sources of Law on the Internet, 10 PACE INTL. L. REv. 403, 403 (1998) (footnote
omitted).
42 See id. The countries with the CISG in force are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China
(PRC), Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian
Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and the USSR
(superseded). In 1999, the Convention will enter into force in Greece and Mongolia
(January 1, 1999 and February 1, 1999, respectively). Id. at 403 n.2. "Eventually,
the number of member countries is expected to surpass 100. It is worth noting,
however, that two major trading countries have chosen not to adopt the convention
to date: Britain and Japan." JBC International, Think You Understand the Vienna
Convention? Then Read This Sad Tale, J. OF COM., June 24, 1998, at lC
("Essentially, when a country adopts the convention, it finds itself with two sales
laws: a domestic sales law and the CISG. In the United States, for example, the
Uniform Commercial Code and the CISG are now both U.S. law.").
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The CISG applies to contracts for the sale of goods if the
contracting parties are located in different countries that have
ratified the treaty.43 For example, if an Italian manufacturer of
motorcycles sold their product to a distributor in New Jersey, the
general rule is that the contract would be governed by the
CISG." In addition, parties not otherwise subject to the CISG
may agree to be governed by it. 45 The validity of such an
agreement is based on the choice-of-law rules of the particular
forum.46  Moreover, parties can agree that the otherwise
applicable CISG does not govern their agreement.47
The flexibility with which parties can agree to apply or avoid
the treaty's law is an important consideration. Commercial
buyers and sellers of the world have the applicable effect of this
body of contract law in the palm of their hands. If they deemed
the CISG unwieldy, every contract for the sale of goods could
void its governing effect. This is especially noteworthy when one
considers that the purpose of the CISG is to reconcile diverse
bodies of contract law.48  In other words, the world's
43 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 1(1)(a); see also HENRY GABRIEL,
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(UCC) 4 (1994); Peter Winship, International Sales Contracts Under the 1980
Vienna Convention, 17 UCC L.J. 55 (1984) (explaining the general provisions of this
part of the CISG); Isaak I. Dore, Choice of Law Under the International Sale
Convention: A U.S. Perspective, 77 AM. J. INTL. L. 521, 522 (1983) ("The United
Nations Secretariat was requested by the Commission to invite states to indicate
whether they intended to accede to the 1964 Conventions.").
44 Cf. Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052, 1998 WL 164824, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998).
45 See GABRIEL, supra note 43, at 5 ("The CISG may also apply to a transaction
if the parties agree to be bound [by it]."); REED KATHREIN & DANIEL MAGRAW,
Introduction in THE CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A
HANDBOOK OF BASIC MATERIALS (Daniel Magraw & Reed Kathrein eds., 2d ed.
1990) ("It is also possible that parties to a contract will choose to specify that the
law of the Convention applies even if it would not otherwise apply."). The
Convention itself does not suggest the parties could agree to be bound by it, but
choice-of-law rules support this notion. See KATHREIN & MAGRAW, supra, at 1-2; see
also U.C.C. § 1-105 (1978); Dore, supra note 43, at 527 (discussing same).
46 See GABRIEL, supra note 43, at 5 (suggesting a choice-of-law clause in a
contract could be barred by "choice-of-law rules in the forum").
47 See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 5, at 32; Aleksandar Goldstajn, Usages of
Trade and other Autonomous Rules of International Trade According to the UN
(1980) Sales Convention, in DUBROVNIK LECTURES, supra note 40, at 95.
48 See Rod N. Andreason, Note, MCC-Marble Ceramic Center: The Parol
Evidence Rule and Other Domestic Law Under the Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 1999 BYU L. REV. 351, 351 (1999) (observing that the
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businesspeople could thwart the United Nations' best attempt to
homogenize international sales law. This has not been the case.
The absence of such avoidance suggests that businesspeople
have embraced the CISG.49  There are several differences
between the CISG and the contract law that students learn in
law school. For example, the CISG recognizes no statute of
frauds. 0 The abandonment of the statute of frauds reflects an
overwhelming rejection of the doctrine among the world's legal
systems.51 Similarly, the next section will discuss why the CISG
does not provide for a parol evidence rule.
III. TREATMENT OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE BY THE CISG
The conclusion that the CISG contains no provision for the
parol evidence rule is not determinable at a mere glance. The
text itself does not explicitly state that there is no parol evidence
triumph of the treaty was "bringing unity to an extremely disorganized branch of
law").
49 On the other hand, it may also suggest they did not know the CISG could be
opted out of, or that the parties were entirely unaware it even applied to a
particular transaction. The evidence, however, leads one to conclude the CISG is
lauded globally. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual
Obligation Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L.
L. 1, 6 (1996) (indicating that by 1988, 47 states adopted the CISG, accounting for
over 60% of the world's trade); Andreason, supra note 48, at 351 (lauding it as "one
of the greatest achievements of modern legal history").
Praise for the achievement of the CISG is not limited to American observers.
For example, German scholar Rolan Loewe wrote that the CISG "represented a
milestone in legal history." Van Alstine, supra, at 7 (quoting ROLAN LOEWE,
INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT 5 (1989)). In addition, Norway has embraced it as
their domestic sales law, and Sweden and Finland have amended their commercial
law to accommodate CISG provisions. See Peter Winship, Domesticating
International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C. Article 2 in Light of the United
Nations Sales Convention, 37 LOY. L. REV. 43, 46 (1991); Andreason, supra note 48,
at 351 n.5.
50 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 11 ("A contract of sale need not be concluded in
or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It
may be proved by any means, including witnesses.").
51 See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 152 (2d ed. 1991) (indicting that there is no
corollary to the UCC statute of frauds). The United States uses the statute of frauds
for sales of goods in excess of $500. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978). Most other common
law systems repealed their statute of frauds for sale of goods contracts. See
HONNOLD, supra at 152. The same is true for civil law nations. See id.; see also
Cigoz, International Sales: Formation of Contracts, 23 NETH. INT'L. L. REV. 257,
270-72 (1976) (surveying the statute of frauds equivalent for various legal systems).
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rule.52 Rather, to make such a determination, scholars have
sought inferential evidence from the text of the document.5 3 In
addition, they have looked to the purpose of the treaty and by
what means the purpose is best served.5 4
A. A Textual Analysis
Article 8 of the CISG relates to contractual construction.55
More importantly, Article 8(3) states that "due consideration is
to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the
negotiations."56 Armed with such clear text, what is a fair
construction of this clause? There is no guarantee that the
drafters intended to exclude the parol evidence rule because
there is nothing explicit in the text to support such a notion.57
Furthermore, including negotiations does not further the quest
52 The most popular rationale for the silence in the text on this issue was
asserted by Professor Honnold. "Article 8 does not directly address the 'parol
evidence rule;' references to this and other technical domestic rules would have
cluttered the draft and would have mystified jurists from legal systems that have no
such rule." HONNOLD, supra note 51, at 170.
53 See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 51, at 170-71 (recognizing a textual
argument); Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code,
7 IND. INTL. & COMIP. L. REV. 279, 282 (1997) ("[Article 8] allows open-ended
reliance on parol evidence.").
54 See Harry M. Fletchner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized
System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and other Challenges to the
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & COM. 187, 187 (1988) (acknowledging
the purpose of the treaty was to adopt "uniform rules"); see generally John E.
Murray, An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters under the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L.
& CO1M1. 11, 44-46 (1988) (discussing circumstances in which extrinsic evidence
might be admitted).
Scholars are not alone in pursuing the theme of uniformity. The text of the
treaty itself confirms the emphasis on homogeneous commercial law. See CISG,
supra note 16, pmbl. ("[Tihe adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for
the international sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic
and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international
trade and promote the development of international trade.").
5 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 8; see also Gyula Eorsi, General Provisions, in
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 2.05 (Nina M. Galson & Hans Smit eds., 1984)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SALES] (discussing Article 8 as the basis for governing
the parties' conduct and the contract's construction).
56 CISG, supra note 16, art. 8(3) (emphasis added).
57 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of explicit
guidance by the drafters on the parol evidence rule issue).
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to exclude the parol evidence rule from CISG cases because the
UCC has already allowed parties to submit negotiations in
court.58 Therefore, it seems that if the language of the CISG is
construed in parallel with UCC Article 2, the parol evidence rule
was not abandoned.
One possible construction of this text supporting the
abandonment argument is centered on the word "all," as used in
Article 8(3) of the CISG.59 "All" is a very encompassing choice of
language. 60 It suggests courts use every possible indicia of party
intent. This construction of CISG Article 8(3) goes further than
section 2-202 of the UCC61 and provides the underpinnings for
the MCC-Marble decision.62 Yet, there is an alternative textual
construction. It is based on the phrase that "all relevant
circumstances" be given "due consideration."63  The word
"relevant" was placed between "all" and "circumstances."6 It
seems clear that "relevant" is used to modify "all" to restrict its
broad connotation. Assuming this is true-that the
"circumstances" to be given "due consideration" are something
less than "all"-what circumstances should be excluded?
The final clause of Article 8(3) provides some examples of
relevant circumstances. 65 These include "the negotiations, any
practices which the parties established between themselves,
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties."66 The latter
three examples mirror the course of dealings, custom/usage, and
58 See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) ("Terms... included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement."). The language of the UCC
prohibits previous agreements to "contradict;" previous understandings may be
proffered for purposes other than contradiction. Therefore, the UCC already allowed
consideration of the negotiations, and one possibility is that the CISG goes no
further. Id.
59 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 8(3) (indicating consideration be given to all
circumstances).
60 See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 29 (10th ed. 1993)
(defining the term as "the whole amount or quantity of" and "as much as possible").
61 See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978). The UCC does not allow all prior agreements to be
proffered to the court. It does not allow those understandings that contradict the
final agreement. See id.
62 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, SpA,
144 F.3d 1384, 1389 (1998) (quoting CISG Article 8(3)).
63 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 8(3) (emphasis added).
64 Id.
65 See id.
66 Id.
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course of performance, respectively, that are expressed in section
1-205 of the UCC.67 The "negotiations," however, presents
difficulty with the interpretation because there are two
interpretations of "negotiations" as used in this clause.
Unfortunately, each leads to a different conclusion about
whether the parol evidence rule should apply to CISG cases.68
One interpretation provides that all the negotiations are
relevant. This is consistent with the other examples given. Any
course of dealings, course of performance, and usage may be
offered to the court. To conclude all negotiations are allowed
before the trier of fact supports the assertion that the CISG has
not provided for a parol evidence rule. A second interpretation
provides that the word "relevant" limits the negotiations in some
way. In addition, the lack of the use of "any" to modify
"negotiations," could be construed as a restriction. If the
negotiations are limited to those which are "relevant," how do we
determine which negotiations fall into this category? For
example, if relevant negotiations are limited to those tending "to
explain or supplement,"69 the exclusionary force of the CISG only
goes so far as the UCC.7°  It seems that such a textual
67 See UCC § 1-205(1) (1978) (discussing "[a] course of dealing."); see also UCC
§ 1-205(2), (3) (defining "a usage of trade" and "[a] course of dealing," respectively).
Use of these examples lends support to the assertion that Article 8(3) be construed
parallel with UCC § 2-202.
68 Very little has been published on the issue of the CISG and its textual
implications. There are three reasons for this. First, cases governed by the CISG are
sparse. See MCC-Marble Ceramic, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, SpA, 144
F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir.1998) ("Despite the CISG's broad scope, surprisingly few
cases have applied the Convention in the United States... .") (citation omitted);
Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhere
is virtually no case law under the Convention .... ."). Second, the treaty is drafted in
several unrelated languages, leading scholars and courts to rely much more on
purpose construction than textual evidence, which can be subtly (or not so subtly)
different in the various languages. See generally Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks
of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INTL. L. 671, 676 n.11 (1999) (acknowledging the
difficulties in multiple language statutory construction even though "production of
multiple language versions of treaties is common"); Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable
Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT'L. &
CONIP. L. REV. 611 (1997). Third, much of the language is broad in order to reconcile
with the general purpose of the treaty, which is to incorporate various legal
systems. See HONNOLD, supra note 51, at 136 ("To read the words of the Convention
with regard for their 'international character' requires that they be projected
against an international background.").
69 U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. n.1 (1978).
70 The commentary is equally uninformative. Id. In fact, a persuasive argument
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construction would not lead one to conclude that the CISG
totally abandoned the parol evidence rule.
No matter what construction of the text one embraces, it is
clear that a textual analysis of the CISG does not provide an
answer to the parol evidence rule issue. One may go so far as to
conclude that the words of Article 8(3) are vague. Therefore, the
purpose of the treaty must be ascertained, and the problem of
parol evidence should be resolved in favor of best serving the
stated purpose.
B. Purpose Construction
Unlike analyzing the textual evidence in the CISG,
analyzing the treaty's purpose is a much easier task. The
preamble and Article 7 of the CISG give those attempting to
construe the treaty ample material to do so.7 1 An analysis of
these provisions seems to lend itself to one clear conclusion-the
CISG has no parol evidence rule provision. The preamble gives
guidance on the purpose of the treaty.72 It states two purposes.73
First, the treaty as a uniform governing system is designed to
"contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international
trade."74 Second, it was adopted to "promote the development of
exists that many CISG provisions should be construed as parallel with their related
UCC Article 2 counterparts. See Andreason, supra note 48, at 355 ("[Mluch of the
Convention mimics the rules found in the Uniform Commercial Code."); Larry A.
DiMatteo, An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International
Business Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals
Unexpected Contractual Liability, =(ji)2, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 67, 79
(1997); John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980
United Nations Convention, 78 AM. J. INTL. L. 289, 292 (1984) ("[Eixperience with
one will be readily translatable for use with the other.").
71 See CISG, supra note 16, pmbl. & art. 7.
72 See id. pmbl. This discussion of statutory construction in the treaty
environment does not change the analytical approach. A treaty, much like a
constitution, is merely another type of statute. Therefore, our well-worn rules of
statutory construction are equally useful.
73 See id.
74 Id.; see also Franco Ferrari, Uniform Application and Interest Rates Under
the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 3, 3-5 (CORNELL INTL. L.J. eds.,
1995) (identifying the obstacle of local law in international trade); Michael Kabik,
Through the Looking-Glass: International Trade in the "Wonderland" of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 INTL. TAX. &
BUS. LAW. 408, 409 (1992) ("International trade has been hindered by a myriad of
distinct domestic laws .... "); James E. Joseph, Contract Formation Under the
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international trade."75  Article 7 of the treaty provides
construction provisions.76 Section 1 of Article 7 provides that one
should take into account the treaty's "international character"
and that construction must dovetail with "the need to promote
uniformity in its application."77 Section 2 of Article 7 states that
cases "not expressly settled" by the CISG must be "settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based."78 It
seems this provision is paramount for domestic courts to use in
ruling on cases governed by the CISG. The message to courts is
clear: construe the treaty in favor of its international flavor and
disregard special domestic rules of commercial law.79 Therefore,
if one were to conclude that the parol evidence rule was unique
to domestic law, it would have no application in cases governed
by the CISG.80
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 3 DICK. J. INTL. L. 107 (1984).
75 CISG, supra note 16, pmbl.
76 See id. art. 7; see also INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 55, § 2.01-2.04
(reviewing construction provisions); Andersen, supra note 41, at 403 ("Uniformity
applies throughout the Convention by way of Article 7(1).").
77 CISG, supra note 16, art. 7(1); see also INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 55,
§ 2.03 ("[The elements of regard to the international character of the Convention
and uniformity in its application were well chosen. The first, as we have seen, was
devised to check the homeward trend, and the second is an admonition to follow
precedents on the international plane.") (footnote omitted).
78 CISG, supra note 16, art. 7(2); see also HONNOLD, supra note 51, at 148-49
(indicating this language is the gap filling provision of the CISG). It was already
submitted that a review of the plain meaning is inconclusive. See supra Part III.A.
Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that parol evidence questions
are "not expressly settled," under the treaty. CISG, supra note 16, art. 7(2).
79 See HONNOLD, supra note 51, at 148-49.
[The domestic law would be foreign to one of the parties, and in most cases
would be unsuited to the problems of international trade .... [R]eferring
gap-filling to the diverse rules of domestic law would never lead to a
uniform solution whereas recourse to the general principles of the
Convention would develop common answers for the questions that arise
within the scope of the law.
Id.
80 The CISG does not provide for a parol evidence rule. See MCC-Marble
Ceramic, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, SpA, 144 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir.
1998) ("[The CISG itself contains no express statement on the role of parol
evidence."); see also Andreason, supra note 48, at 358-59 (concluding that there is
no explicit parol evidence provision in the CISG); John E. Murray, An Essay on the
Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 11, 44 (1988) ("CISG
rejects the parol evidence rule in the most frugal terms.").
Parties with a contract governed by the CISG have two options to protect their
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IV. RELEVANT U.S. CASE LAW
Interestingly, despite the broad reach of the CISG, there is
relatively little CISG case law.8 1 Even more rare is a CISG case
relating to the parol evidence rule.82 Nevertheless, looking at
the relevant cases is important to understanding how American
courts view this issue.
The first reported case on the CISG and parol evidence was
Filanto, SpA v. Chilewich International Corp. 3 In Filanto, the
dispute involved other issues, such as the application of an
arbitration provision.84 Chief Judge Brient, however, dropped a
footnote stating: "the Convention essentially rejects both the
Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule."8 5  This
observation appears to be the first judicial acknowledgement
that the CISG does not incorporate the parol evidence rule.
In Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v.
American Business Center, Inc.,8 6 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed the issue of the CISG and the parol evidence
rule in only the second reported case on that topic. The
defendant corporation argued that two terms, orally agreed
written instrument. First, they may simply agree that the CISG does not apply to
their agreement and specify the application of law from a jurisdiction where the rule
is in effect. See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 5, at 153. Second, the parties may
even be able to create their own parol evidence rule through the use of a merger
clause. See id. Only once have American courts mentioned the issue of merger
clauses in connection with the CISG. See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1391 ("[T]o the
extent parties wish to avoid parol evidence problems they can do so by including a
merger clause in their agreement that extinguishes any and all prior agreements
and understandings not expressed in the writing.") (footnote omitted); see also
Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Fletchner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in
International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. &
COM. 239, 252 (1993).
81 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1389 (recognizing that "surprisingly few cases
have applied the Convention in the United States"); Delchi Carrier, SpA. v. Rotorex
Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that "there is virtually no
caselaw under the Convention"); see also Anthony S. Winer, The CISG Convention
and Thomas Franck's Theory of Legitimacy, 19 J. INTL. L. & Bus. 1, 3 n.20 (1998).
82 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1389 (noting that "only two reported decisions
touch upon the parol evidence rule").
83 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1993).
84 See Filanto, 789 F. Supp at 1236 (framing the issue "of whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate their disputes").
85 Id. at 1238 n.7 (dictum).
86 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993).
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upon, discharged its obligation under the contract.87 The court
held that the parol evidence rule barred the defendant from
offering proof of the oral terms.88 This holding was based on the
application of Texas law.8 9 More importantly, Judge Barksdale
wrote that the parol evidence rule applied whether Texas law or
the CISG governed. 90 The Fifth Circuit's decision to apply Texas
law and not the CISG drew substantial criticism.91 To determine
whether a contract is governed by the CISG, a simple three-part
test is applied.92 First, the parties must be from different
nations.93 By all accounts, Beijing's principal place of business
was the People's Republic of China,94 and American Business
Center was a Texas corporation.95 Both countries were parties to
87 See id. at 1182. ABC contended that the writing reflected only one part of
their three-part agreement, in which ABC agreed to "adhere to a payment
schedule." Id.
88 See id. at 1184.
89 See id. at 1182 n.9 ("We apply Texas law in this diversity action.").
9D See id. ("We need not resolve this choice of law issue, because our discussion
is limited to application of the parol evidence rule (which applies regardless).").
91 See Harry M. Fletchner, More U.S. Decisions on the U.N. Sales Convention:
Scope, Parol Evidence, "Validity," and Reduction of Price Under Article 50, 14 J.L. &
COAI. 153, 163 (1995) ("[Tjhere is substantial argument that the contract comes
within the scope of CISG."); Kolosky, supra note 39, at 213 ("The dicta in Beijing
Metals ... soon sparked academic debate."); David H. Moore, Note, The Parol
Evidence Rule and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Justifying Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v.
American Business Center, Inc., 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1347, 1356 (doubting "an
accurate conclusion" was reached).
Professor Fletchner was the most prominent critic. He argues that "the
approach to parol evidence questions taken by the Fifth Circuit in Beijing Metals is
inconsistent with CISG, and that the result in the case might well have changed
had the court applied the Convention." Fletchner, supra at 158.
92 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 1-4, 6.
93 See id. art. 1 ("This Convention applies to contracts ... between parties
whose places of business are in different... [sitates.").
94 See Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr.,
Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1179 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that Beijing "is a company
formed and existing under the laws of the People's Republic"); see also Moore, supra
note 91, at 1356.
95 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, SpA, 144
F.3d 1384, 1390 n.15 (11th Cir. 1998) ("The Beijing Metals opinion does not state
the place of the defendant's incorporation, but the defendant must have been a
United States corporation because the court noted that the case was a 'diversity
action.'") (citations omitted). If American Business Center were not a United States
Corporation, no diversity jurisdiction would attach to the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1994).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the CISG for the relevant period. 96 Second, the "preponderant
part" of the contract must have related to the sale of goods. 97
The parties' contract related to fitness equipment manufactured
by Beijing Metals.98 Third, the parties must not have agreed to
avoid the application of the CISG.99 There was no indication
from Judge Barksdale's opinion that the parties attempted to
avoid the CISG.100 Since the three-part test was satisfied,
criticism of the court's decision to apply Texas law appears well-
founded. Subsequent cases dealing directly on this issue
explicitly diverted from the seemingly flawed dicta of Beijing
Metals.
American courts had not dealt directly with the CISG and
the parol evidence rule until MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v.
Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, SpA. 1 1 In this case, the parties
agreed to a requirements contract where D'Agostino would sell
ceramic tile to MCC. 10 2 D'Agostino did not satisfy MCC's orders
for April, May, and August of 1991.103 MCC filed a suit for
breach of contract and D'Agostino argued that MCC defaulted on
payments for previous shipments. 10 4 D'Agostino pointed to "pre-
printed terms" on the contract giving D'Agostino the right to
cancel the agreement if MCC failed to deliver payment. 10 5 At
trial, MCC sought to prove that the parties' agreement did not
include the pre-printed terms by offering extrinsic evidence of
96 See supra note 42 (listing nations who are parties to the treaty).
97 CISG, supra note 16, art. 3; see also id. art. 2.
98 See Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1178-79 (stating that the parties entered into
a business relationship "in order to cooperatively develop the fitness... equipment
market in the U.S. and Canada").
99 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 6 ("The parties may exclude the application of
this Convention."); Filanto SpA v. Chilewich Intl Corp., 789 F. Supp 1229, 1237
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); HONNOLD, supra note 51, at 125; see also Salve Regina College v.
Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991).
100 If the contract had included such a provision, it would have been
unnecessary for the court to engage in their discussion of application of law; the
CISG would certainly have been inapplicable. See Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1182-
83 n.9.
101 144 F.3d 1384, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Delchi Carrier SpA. v.
Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d. 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing that "there is
virtually no case law under the [CISG]").
102 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1385.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 1385-86.
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the negotiations. 10 6 The district court applied the parol evidence
rule and granted summary judgment in favor of D'Agostino.10 7
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding contracts governed by the
CISG were not subject to the parol evidence rule. 08
In its analysis, the court announced that the case was
governed by the CISG.10 9 Then, the court determined that the
CISG had no express provision for the parol evidence rule.110
After reviewing the reported opinions concerning the issue, the
court realized that the persuasive value of these previous
decisions was negligible.1"' The Eleventh Circuit, therefore,
carved a clean slate onto which MCC-Marble could be decided.
112
The court certainly could have circumvented the issue of the
applicability of the parol evidence rule to CISG cases. It is well
established that extrinsic evidence of negotiations is always
admissible to prove that a writing is not an integration. 113
105 See id at 1386. The evidence included an affidavit from Juan Carlos Monzon,
president of MCC. See id. More importantly, "MC also filed affidavits from
Silingardi and Copelli, D'Agostino's representatives at the trade fair, [where the
parties consummated their agreement] which supports Monzon's claim that the
parties subjectively intended not to be bound by the terms on the reverse side of the
order form." Id. The pre-printed terms in dispute in this case were on the reverse of
the order form. See id. at 1385.
107 See id. at 1387; Andreason, supra note 48, at 358 ("The magistrate judge
held those affidavits to be barred by the parol evidence rule, and the district court
agreed.") (footnote omitted); CISG, supra note 16, art. 8.
1IN See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1388-89 (addressing in detail the question of
whether the parol evidence rule plays any role in cases involving the CISG).
109 See id. at 1386-87. In fact, the parties themselves agreed that the CISG is
the governing law in the case. See id. at 1386-87. Therefore, application of the
three-part test was not needed. More importantly, the problem for which Beijing
Metals was so castigated, failure to apply the CISG, was avoided in MCC-Marble.
110 See id. at 1389 ("The CISG itself contains no express statement on the role
of parol evidence."); HONNOLD, supra note 51, at 170. Compare CISG, supra note 16,
art. 11 (stating that a contract of sale need not be concluded or evidenced in writing)
with U.C.O. § 2-201 (1978) (precluding the enforcement of oral contracts for the sale
of goods involving more than $500). The court also disposed of the issue of whether
the parol evidence rule applied to the case anyway on grounds that it was a rule of
substantive law. See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1388-89; see also FARNSWORTH,
supra note 18, at 194. If it were a rule of evidence, it seemingly would be applied
without regard to the fact that the CISG governed the dispute.
"I See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1390. The court implicitly embraced the same
criticism of the Beijing Metals opinion as Professor Fletchner. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
112 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1388 (referring to "a question of first
impression in this circuit"); see also U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978).
113 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(a) (1981) ("Agreements
ST..JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Instead, the court chose to base its decision on broader, more
ubiquitous grounds. The Eleventh Circuit rested its decision on
two propositions. First, the court looked at the CISG textual
reference in Article 8(3) to the "negotiations."114 Resting a
decision on a treaty's textual embodiment, especially when the
document is drafted in multiple languages, is a tenuous
proposition." 5 Fortunately, the Eleventh Circuit went further.
The court acknowledged that American jurisdictions found the
rule useful to control breach of contract cases when a party
offered extrinsic evidence. 116  They also recognized that
uniformity of international commercial law was "[olne of the
primary factors motivating the negotiations and adoption of the
CISG."117 In order to facilitate the main purposes of the CISG,118
the court reviewed the treatment of extrinsic evidence by other
member nations and concluded that "a wide number of other
States Party to the CISG have rejected the rule in their domestic
jurisdictions." 19 Therefore, in the interest of promoting uniform
and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are
admissible in evidence to establish that the writing is or is not an integrated
agreement."). This would allow MCC to offer the affidavits of the three individuals
to prove that the printed form did not embody the parties' final agreement. In this
case, application of the common law (UCC) would seemingly have provided the same
result.
114 MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1389. The court readily embraced the phrase
"including the negotiations," and confirmed the CISG commitment to the use of oral
contracts and terms by referring to the treaty's failure to include a statute of frauds
provision. See id.
115 See supra note 68.
116 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1390-91 (discussing the flexibility needed in
applying the parol evidence rule).
117 Id. at 1391.
118 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing the policy
objectives of the treaty).
119 MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1391. The court did not survey various legal
systems, but referred to the proposition as "in accordance with the great weight of
academic commentary on the issue." Id. at 1390. Several scholars have indicated
that the parol evidence rule barely existed in civil law systems. See DiMatteo, supra
note 70, at 104 ("ITihe CISG applies the view of many of the civil law countries that
a writing is not a required formality to the finding of a contract."). The court itself
acknowledged, albeit in a footnote, that "[o]utside of Europe and North America, the
parol evidence rule is nonexistent. Even in Europe, it is rare; Germany has no parol
evidence rule, and France's version of the rule does not apply to commercial
transactions." Andreason, supra note 48, at 359 n.50; see also Murray, supra note
54, at 45 ("Civil law countries have often managed without it, or have been willing
to apply it sparingly.") (footnotes omitted). Even countries with legal systems
similar to the United States have little confidence in the rule. See Andreason, supra
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application of the CISG among the member nations, the court
held that the rule did not apply and therefore MCC could offer
the affidavits for consideration by the trier of fact. 20
Similarly, in Claudia v. Oliveri Footwear Ltd.,121 the court
refused to grant summary judgment 122 and held that "contracts
governed by the CISG are freed from the limits of the parol
evidence rule and [that] there is a wider spectrum of admissible
evidence to consider in construing the terms of the parties'
agreement."' 2  In Mitchell Aircraft Spares Inc. v. European
Aircraft Service AB,'124 the court indicated that "it must consider
any evidence concerning any negotiations, agreements, or
statements made prior to the issuance of the purchase order."125
These rulings suggest American law is settled on the
abandonment of the parol evidence rule for cases governed by
the CISG. 126
note 48, at 359 n.50 (referring to Canada and England). Many countries make
virtually all oral contracts and oral terms enforceable, assuming a demonstration of
mutual assent. The thrust of much of the foreign disdain for the statute of frauds
and the parol evidence rule is cultural. They favor oral dealings out of a sense of
trust. See WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS: A
PRIMER ON DRAFTING, NEGOTIATING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES 5 (3d ed. 1998).
120 See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1391 (holding that the parol evidence rule did
not apply because MCC's affidavits evidenced a subjective intent for MCC not to be
bound to the conditions on the reverse side of the form).
121 No. 96 Civ. 8025, 1998 WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998). Since the MCC-
Marble case was not decided until June 29, 1998, the Claudia court derived their
ruling without the persuasive authority of MCC-Marble.
Claudia currently has no further reported developments. Since this issue is in
its appellate infancy, it will be interesting to see if and how the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals deals with this issue.
122 See id. at *11.
=2s Id. at *5; see also Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of
Enforceability. Unintended Contractual Liability in International Business
Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT'L. L. 111, 127 (1997) (indicating that courts are "freed from
the limitations of the parol evidence rule"); John E. Murray, Different Laws Might
Apply to Foreign Buys Under the United Nations Convention for the International
Sale of Goods, PURcHASING, Oct. 19, 1995, at 30 ("[Any relevant statements made
in negotiations prior to the signing of the contract are admissible into evidence.").
124 23 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
125 Id. at 920. The defendant argued that the CISG applied; the plaintiff did not
contest this assertion. See id. at 918. Nevertheless, after holding that evidence of
the negotiations was admissible, the court mentioned that the evidence would still
be admissible even if Illinois law were applied. See id. at 921. Compare id., with
Beijing Metals & Minerals v. American Bus. Ctr., 993 F.2d 1178, 1179 n.9 (5th Cir.
1993) (applying Texas law).
126 This Part illustrated how every court dealing with the parol evidence rule
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V. DETERIORATION OF THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE RULE
The cases beginning with Thompson and culminating with
MCC-Marble suggest a clear change in the way courts are
willing to permit evidence of the negotiations. Further
deterioration culminating in abandonment of the rule's force can
be further supported. To do so, exploration to the core of the rule
is required. At the rule's epicenter is its purpose. If the
underlying objectives are identified and it is concluded that
these objectives are no longer embraced, abandonment is
appropriate.
A. Trusting the Trier
One policy underlying the parol evidence rule is the
traditional notion that the trier of fact is impressionable and
must be protected from the perjury often associated with parol
evidence. 127 It seems greater trust is held in the trier of fact
today, which would support the assertion that the associated
doctrinal framework should be dismantled. To accurately assess
the policy shortcomings of the parol evidence rule, the
environment in which commercial litigation takes place must be
looked at. Specifically, in the American court system, two types
of trials exist-bench trials and jury trials.
1. Bench Trials
Assume for a moment that there is significant concern that
the fact finder is often persuaded by perjurious testimony.128 It
issue has directly held that it did not apply. In addition, every court which has
addressed the issue has rejected (implicitly or explicitly) the dicta in Beijing Metals.
See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (discussing Beijing Metals). But see
Rebecca Amthor, Note, Eleventh Circuit: Survey of Recent Decision: International
Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 265, 268 (1998-99) ("Whether other circuits take a similar
position with regard to contracts governed by the CISG remains to be seen.").
127 See CORBIN, supra note 10, at 522 ("[Tjhe rule is supported by the public
policy of preventing frauds and perjuries by limiting evidence of facts that
contradict a valid contract."); Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is it Necessary?, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 972, 982 (1969) (indicating "that to allow extrinsic evidence to
vary... terms would open the door to perjury"); see also Richard D. Dreyfus, The
Effect of Masterson v. Sine on California's Parol Evidence Rule, 43 L.A. BAR BULL.
411 (1968).
128 Scholars and courts are perpetually concerned with witness testimony
misleading the jurors. See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the
Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 194 (1990) ("Some
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makes little sense that such a rule extends to bench trials. At
bench trials, the judge acts as the decision-making authority on
the law and trier of fact.129 If society lacks confidence in trial
judges' ability to detect perjurious testimony, it suggests a
fundamental problem running to the heart of our system of
justice.130 Also, at bench trials, the judge is assessing the
evidence twice. The judge must first determine whether the
proffered extrinsic evidence may become part of the trial record.
If the judge concludes the evidence is worthy of admission, he or
she may consider it in the role as trier of fact. 31 Therefore, it
seems that an attempt to shield the fact finder from certain
evidence would be unworkable in the context of a bench trial.
2. Jury Trials
It appears likely that an attempt to deceive the fact finder
by one of the parties would be more effective in a jury trial.
Avoiding the jury in such cases prompted the rise of contract law
as independent from tort law. 32 As the twenty first century
courts have also been concerned that [psychological] testimony could prove costly,
prolong a trial, and still mislead the jury by presenting 'extraneous information
having an aura of scientific credibility.' "); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig,
Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the
Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 417 (1990)
(indicating that judges may even mislead jurors); J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-
choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 845-46 (1989)
(stating that prejudice can occur when "jurors draw unwarranted inferences from
the evidence, ignore undisputed facts, overlook gaps in one side's case, or otherwise
become unable to keep the evidence in its proper perspective").
129 See, e.g., Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 435 (6th Cir. 1999); Lyles v. State,
472 S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ga. 1996).
130 Cf HON. H. LEE SAROKIN, A SPEECH AT WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL TO
COMMEMORATE LAW DAY (1998), reprinted in 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 171, 173 (1998)
(acknowledging that judges are the guardians of the judicial system); Jonathan P.
Nase, Why Judges Leave the Bench: Pennsylvania 1978-1993, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 739,
751 (1995) ("Judges are a crucial asset in any judicial system."); Philip M. Pro &
Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and Administration of the
Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (1995) (noting the
increased importance of magistrate judges).
131 See People v. True, 272 N.E.2d 24, 26 (M. App. Ct. 1971). Interestingly, the
case often referred to as the beacon of contemporary parol evidence rule
jurisprudence, Masterson v. Sine, based its holding, in part, on this "trusting the
trier" concept. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (concluding that
"evidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the factfinder
is likely to be mislead").
132 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 107-09 (2d ed. 1995)
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begins, such notions should be rejected for two reasons. First,
"[olur system allocates to the jury the function of determining
credibility of witnesses."133 There is nothing to suggest that
"their normal credibility-determining function" is ineffective, or
even less effective in breach of contract cases "than construction
accidents, consumer injuries or gift tax cases."134 Second, the
idea that juries favor the underdog is unfounded. 135
(suggesting distrust of the jury "played some role" in the creation of a schism
between contract law and tort law). "To the extent contract litigation can be phrased
as questions of law for the court, the vagaries of juries can be controlled." Id. Other
legal systems have discarded trial by jury in contract law cases. For example, the
English have "virtual[ly] aboli[shed] ... the jury system in civil cases." Justin
Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick
Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1055 (1968); see also Campbell Discount Co. v. Gall,
1 Q.B. 431, 439 (C.A. 1961).
133 Sweet, supra note 132, at 1055; see also Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice
and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV.
339, 405-06 (1994) (discussing the jury's duty to examine witnesses' credibility).
134 Sweet, supra note 132, at 1055; Note, supra note 127, at 988 ("The same
issues of credibility arise in other areas of the law where the jury is faced with
evidence from witnesses who may have a claim on its sympathy or evidence which
seems inherently suspect."). These scholars suggest that juries can deal with
personal injury cases, where the plaintiff walks into court with a neck brace,
feigning an injury, as well as they can deal with a party recounting an oral contract
term. It seems such a proposition does not violate the public's sense ofjustice.
135 See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 327-28 (1998) (arguing that civil
jurors are not anti-business but are largely supportive of the aims of American
business and are concerned about the negative effects of excessive litigation on
business corporations); Laura Gaston Dooley, Essay, Our Juries, Our Selves: The
Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 327-41
(1995) (discussing the 20th century history of civil juries). Juries have had a
"bipolar presence" in modern times. On one hand, the jury represents true
democracy and is a respected icon in American culture. On the other hand, recent
controversial jury verdicts have intensified the debate about the effectiveness of the
jury as the decision-maker in the court system. Id.; see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real Agreement, Real Changes, 32 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 213 (1999) (stating that "social science research provides no support
for the public's perception that this failure is due to the inclusion of jurors who are
biased or unfit" and that the greatest weakness of jurors is their lack of
understanding of the law). Professor Hans used "public opinion poll data and
archival research" to conclude that "there is no evidence that Americans generally
hold heated anti-business attitudes," and "the evidence for a defendant's wealth
effect is weak." Richard Lempert, Why Do Juries Get a Bum Rap? Reflections on the
Work of Valerie Hans, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 (1998). The University of
Chicago Jury Project, the first major jury survey study in the United States, studied
verdicts "in over four thousand civil trials that occurred during the 1950s." Neil
Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 853 (1998). Juries have been labeled as "incompetent, capricious,
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3. Protecting the Writing
A second reason behind the parol evidence rule is to
encourage written contracts by protecting them from oral
attack. 36 The parol evidence rule seeks to give greatest effect to
contract terms memorialized in writing. In so doing, the belief is
that parties take greater care to make the written instrument a
total integration. 37 There is no indication this higher regard for
writings has influenced the practice of contract formation. In
fact, disputes involving the parol evidence rule are among the
most heavily litigated issues in American courts. 38 In this
unreliable, biased,...." Id. at 849. However, the data revealed that the judge and
the jury agreed on the issue of liability 78% of the time. In cases of disagreement,
the judge still found the jury verdict reasonable. See id. at 853; see also Note, supra
note 127, at 985; HARRY KALVERN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63 (1966);
Harry Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964) (discussing
the acumen of the civil jury in the United States). This compatibility suggests that
either jurors do not favor the underdog or both judges and jurors favor the
underdog.
Traditionally, however, authorities have argued that juries need to be controlled
in such cases. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Supplementing Written Agreements:
Restating the Parol Evidence Rule in Terms of Credibility and Relative Fault, 34
EMORY L.J. 93, 95 (1985) (discussing preference for the " 'little guy,' in the
transaction at hand"); Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory
Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (1983) (stating that "[l]eft
to their own devices, jurors may favor underdogs by relying upon alleged oral terms
thereby deciding the case in a manner calculated to avoid a perceived injustice");
McCormick, supra note 27, at 366 ("The average jury will, other things being equal,
lean strongly in favor of the side which is threatened with possible injustice and
certain hardship by the enforcement of the writing."); Michael A. Lawrence,
Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: Status in the Law of Contract,
Revisited, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1075 (indicating that jurors' lack of
sophistication may favor the party without deep pockets).
136 See Martin-Davidson, supra note 9, at 12 (explaining that the "parol
evidence rule provides greater protection for written agreements" and should be
applied because written evidence is more accurate than human memory); Wallach,
supra note 8, at 653 ("Written contracts have long enjoyed a preferred status in the
law over oral contracts as a result of their tendency to be more accurate and
detailed.").
137 See Mooney, supra note 13, at 1147 ("The assumption that most parties in
fact reduce their entire agreement to a single, perfectly accurate writing seems [to
modem scholars and judges] increasingly unrealistic. Worse, judging by reported
decisions at least, the parol evidence rule seemed actually to assist more
dissemblers than it thwarted."); Sweet, supra note 132, at 1047 ("Some of the parol
evidence rule's adverse effect on counseling and litigation might be excusable if the
rule caused contracting parties to put their entire agreement in the writing. But the
rule has not had this effect.").
138 See Sweet, supra note 132, at 1047 (suggesting that the "volume" of cases on
the issue indicates that there are many part-written and part-oral contracts); see
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respect, it seems the parol evidence rule has failed. In addition,
the "slippery memory" rationale for protection is less
necessary.1 39  Business transactions are now conducted
electronically as often as face-to-face. 140 Until electronic media
garnered widespread acceptance in the business world, a party's
extrinsic evidence was often substantiated or refuted only by
another's oral testimony. 4 1 Today, it is common to refute or
also Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect
Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through Default Provisions, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 42 (1996) (indicating that a "large volume of consumer cases"
arise under the parol evidence rule).
139 Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers:
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229,
273 (1998) (arguing that to commit something to memory after reading it without
anything else is no way to remember it); see also Raoul Berger, On Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties: "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
296 (1986); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 900 (1985) (stating that the common law was not concerned with
the subjective intent of the parties, but the contracting parties were presumed to
have put their exact intentions in writing and to have been aware of the law's
canons of interpretation). One should be encouraged to" 'commit... to writing, and
not to trust slippery memory.' " Ross, supra at 273 (quoting WILLIAM PHILLIPS,
STUDII LEGALIs RATIO 155-56 (1662)). "Slippery" is used in the sense that parties'
recollection will fade and become altered. It is not intended to refer to the perjurious
intent of parties. Id.
14o See Carl Pacini & David Sinason, Auditor Liability for Electronic Commerce
Transaction Assurance: The CPA/CA Webtrust, 36 AM. BUs. L.J. 479, 480 (1999)
(indicating that increased customer confidence in electronic commerce leads to
increased business opportunities); Patrick Weston, First Amendment Internet Crime
Statutes: Fraud: American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Miller, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 403, 411 (1999) (discussing the commercial advantage for "consumers to
find information and conduct business transactions almost instantaneously");
Amelia H. Boss, Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well? An Introduction to the
Practitioners' Perspectives, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 89, 98 (1994) (acknowledging the
"increased use of electronic technologies in the conduct" of business dealings);
Jenine Elco Graves, Comment, Physical in Cyberspace: As Electronic Commerce
Takes Off, Does Quill Leave Local Merchants in the Dust?, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 261, 264
(1999) ("The Web has had a dramatic affect on both business-to-business and
business-to-consumer transactions.").
"The huge development of electronic commerce necessitates many other changes
such as the use of electronic records and electronic or digitized signatures. More
than forty states have either enacted or are enacting new legislation to allow the
use of such electronic forms in place of standard documents and signatures." Dr.
John Murray, Jr., Big Changes are Due in Laws Governing U.S. Commerce,
PURCHASING, July 15, 1999, at 59.
141 Cf Jonathan Bick, The Electric Commerce Landscape, N.J. L.J., June 28,
1999, at 36 (stating that electronic commerce is a huge, growing business and
experts estimate that online spending could reach thirty billion dollars by the year
2000); Francis Dunmer Fisher, 1984 Survey of Books Relating to the Law, 82 MICH.
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support an understanding between parties by producing e-mails,
voice mail recordings, faxes, or other electronic media as
evidence. 42 In addition, today's fast-paced business environment
frequently does not allow for thoroughly drafted, well-planned
written contracts. 43 Boiler plate contracts and oral agreements
drive the modern world of commerce in many respects. 44
Therefore, rules of exclusion are unnecessarily cumbersome and
obtrusive145
L. REV. 981, 983 (1984) (reviewing JOHN TYDEMAN ET AL., TELETEXT AND
VIDEOTEXT IN THE UNITED STATES: MARKET POTENTIAL, TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC
POLICY ISSUES (1982)) (realizing business negotiated electronically will eclipse
"face-to-face" bargaining); Jeffrey Kagan, Note, The Indelibility of Invisible Ink: A
Critical Survey of the Enforcement of Oral Contracts without the Statute of Frauds
Under the U.C.C., 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 423, 425-26 (1997) (discussing the statute
of frauds and recommending the repeal of its formal writing requirement).
142 Such records are deemed reliable in other legal context. See, e.g., Deborah L.
Wilkerson, Electronic Commerce Under the U.C.C. Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds:
Are Electronic Messages Enforceable?, 41 KAN. L. REV. 403, 425 (1992) (discussing
the enforceability of electronic messages under the UCC statute of frauds and ways
to enhance the integrity of modem computerized records); Egon Guttman, Federal
Regulation of Transfer Agents, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 281, 317 (1985) (referring to the
necessity of telephone records for regulation of transfer agents); Lee A. Watson,
Note, Communication, Honesty, and Contract: Three Buzzwords for Maintaining
Ethical Hourly Billing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 189, 195 (1998) (identifying such
records as vital to proper client billing). These sources suggest that electronic
communications can also be used to prove contract terms not reflected in the final
writing. In commercial law, revisions to UCC Article 2 have attempted to address
this issue. Article 2 now allows electronic forms and signatures to facilitate the
development of electronic commerce. See Murray, supra note 140, at 59.
143 In fact, today's business world often does not afford people time to do much
of anything. See, e.g., Thomas R. Marton, Child-Centered Child Care: An Argument
for a Class Integrated Approach, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 313, 350 (1993)
(indicating businesspeople often sacrifice time with their family); Anthony
Kruglinski, Going into a Deal, What You Think is True Probably Isn't, RAILWAY
AGE, Aug. 1, 1999, at 10 (indicating the greater value of communication in an era
where time is precious); Thinking Like an Agent, AGENCY SALES MAG., Feb. 1998, at
4 (pointing out businesspeople's need for planning).
144 See Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with
Solutions, 80 KY. L.J. 815, 836 (1992) (concluding boiler plate provisions are used to
conserve time); Robert J. MacPherson, Advice to Lawyers: Don't Limit ADR as
Option, N.J. LAW., Feb. 23, 1998, at 6 (discussing boiler plate arbitration clauses).
145 This is especially true when the rule of exclusion frustrates the
ascertainment of actual party intent. See Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley, On
Parol: The Construction and Interpretation of Written Agreements and the Role of
Extrinsic Evidence in Contract Litigation, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 702 (1997)
(discussing party intent in light of the parol evidence rule and the fact that the
court determines the parties' intentions and rights under an agreement).
2000]
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VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE RULE'S ABANDONMENT
The refusal to apply the parol evidence rule beyond CISG
cases is an admittedly aggressive proposition. 146 Yet, there is
support for the idea that provisions of the CISG may influence
the UCC.147 Even though the CISG is derived from the laws of
many jurisdictions, 148 the United States is the most influential
member nation and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that
some of the UCC was ultimately incorporated in the CISG.149
Therefore, it is possible that the approach to the parol evidence
rule by the CISG may influence the approach to the parol
evidence rule of the UCC.150
Similarly, abandonment of the parol evidence rule in breach
of contract cases produces disadvantages. Consider the effect of
the aforementioned proposition upon litigation strategy. The
court will allow a party to admit extrinsic evidence of an
additional term. The trier of fact must then make a credibility
assessment and determine if the proffered term is part of the
final agreement. Therefore, the court is effectively precluded
from granting summary judgement in these cases because an
146 It is not, however, a position unknown to the world of legal scholarship. See
Sweet, supra note 132; Note, supra note 127.
147 See Winship, supra note 49, at 45-50 (recommending areas of the UCC that
should be reconciled with the CISG). But see Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability
of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods as a Model for
the Revision of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1995
(1998) (suggesting that the CISG might be a good source for "selective borrowing"
for Article 2 because it reflects current transactions in a different manner than
Article 2); Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 NW.
J. INTL. L. & BUS. 165, 171-78 (1995) (offering reasons the CISG is inappropriate
for an entire Article 2 revision, but suggesting that it might be appropriate for
'selective borrowing"). Professor Gabriel conceded that recently revised Article 2
provisions reflect similar provisions in the CISG. See Gabriel, supra, at 2014 nn.89-
92. Yet, he argues that the amendments to Article 2 are merely consistent with the
CISG, updated to reflect contemporary views of commercial law. See id. at 2014.
Professor Gabriel suggests the CISG did not influence the UCC revisions. See id.
148 See DiMatteo, supra note 123, at 133 ("[The CISG was forged from the
world's different national legal systems.").
149 See DiMatteo, supra note 123, at 133; Richard D. Kearney, Book Review, 78
AM. J. INTL. L. 289, 292 (1984) (regarding CISG laws "sufficiently akin to Article 2
of the UCC so that experience with one will be readily translatable for use with the
other").
150 See Gabriel, supra note 147, at 2014 (comparing the revised UCC Article 2
provisions with parallel CISG terms).
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issue of material fact will always exist.151 In jurisdictions where
judicial economy is an especially important consideration,
abandonment of the parol evidence rule may be discouraged.
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CONCLUSION
The parol evidence rule, as a device to exclude evidence of
agreements made prior to the adoption of a final written
instrument, should be abandoned. First, the trend in the case
law highlights an increasingly lenient application of the rule,
suggesting that courts are comfortable admitting extrinsic
evidence. Second, the CISG, which governs a significant amount
of the commercial transactions occurring in the United States
every day,153 does not recognize a parol evidence rule. The rule
is castigated, or even non-existent, in virtually every jurisdiction
outside the United States. No authority has suggested a
uniquely American legal precept as a basis for the rule's
existence in American courts and other provisions of UCC Article
2 have been reworked to parallel similar CISG terms. Third, the
rule's underlying policy objectives are no longer readily
embraced by society or the legal community. More importantly,
those goals do not accurately reflect the commercial environment
of the twenty first century. Many judges and scholars have long
called for the demise of the parol evidence rule. The MCC-
Marble decision provides critics of the parol evidence rule an
impetus to renew the debate.
151 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating that a motion for summary judgment will
be granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the afidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact .... ").
152 There is no indication that foreign legal systems feel that an expansion of
the parol evidence rule's application would solve their problems with backlogged
cases.
153 See Michael G. Davies, International Sale of Goods: Do Not Ignore United
Nations Convention, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 20, 1999, at S1. Davies writes:
[There are] billions of dollars of foreign trade between the U.S. and the
CISG's other signatory nations and although there is virtually no U.S. case
law interpreting CISG, this will change in the future because CISG
governs all contracts between parties with places of business in different
nations, provided both nations are signatories to the Convention.
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